[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
was not as closely identified with the of Josef Bem (a hero from the Polish
rank-and-file, and launch a fierce
Rajk trial, and therefore was willing to revolution of 1830 and the Hungarian
struggle on the ideological front.66
permit the reburial. Gero viewed the revolution of 1848), the demonstrators
measure as a convenient way to ingra- split into several large groups and
These suggestions were of little rel-
tiate himself with Tito (whom he had moved to key points in the city, where
evance to the turbulent political scene
met in the Crimea at the beginning of they voiced demands for national in-
in Hungary. By early September, Gero
October) as well as a means of defus- dependence and democracy. A huge
366 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN
statue of Stalin in the center of Budapest sation is hard to explain. By that point unanimity, an unprecedented step for
was torn down. Similar rallies were he had already transmitted an appeal for such an important matter. The Pre-
held in other Hungarian cities, where urgent military assistance to the mili- sidium also decided to send Mikoyan
thousands of protesters called on the tary attache at the Soviet embassy, so it and Suslov to Budapest along with the
government to resign. Faced by this is unclear why he would not want to KGB chief, Ivan Serov, to provide on-
growing wave of unrest, Gero desper- raise the matter directly with the-scene reports, following up on the
ately tried to regain control of the situ- Khrushchev. Gero s behavior in the two tasks they had accomplished in Hungary
ation, but the protests continued to months prior to the revolution, when he earlier in the year (see above). In the
mount. chose to be out of the country at critical meantime, Khrushchev authorized So-
Gero s plight was made immeasur- moments, was odd in itself; but his re- viet defense minister Zhukov to rede-
ably worse later in the evening when action on 23 October seems even more ploy Soviet units into Budapest to as-
Hungarian state security (AVH) forces, peculiar. sist Hungarian troops and state security
acting without authorization, opened Despite this strange twist, informa- forces in the restoration of public or-
fire on unarmed demonstrators outside tion about the rebellion quickly made der. 76 Khrushchev s directive was
the main radio station in Budapest who its way to Moscow. When the Soviet promptly transmitted to Lashchenko by
were seeking to enter the building to attache received Gero s request, he im- the chief of the Soviet General Staff,
broadcast their demands. The shootings mediately passed it on to Andropov, Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii, who speci-
precipitated a chaotic rebellion, which who telephoned the commander of So- fied that the bulk of the Soviet troops
was much too large for the Hungarian viet troops in Hungary, General in Hungary were to be used in estab-
state security organs to handle on their Lashchenko. Lashchenko responded lishing control over the most important
own. Soviet advisers and military that he could not comply with the re- sites in the capital and in restoring or-
commanders in Hungary had been try- quest without explicit authorization der, while others were to seal off
ing since early October to convince from political leaders. Andropov then Hungary s border with Austria. 77
Hungarian officials that stringent secu- cabled Gero s appeal directly to Mos- Having finally received due autho-
rity precautions were needed to cope cow, which prompted Khrushchev to rization, Lashchenko was able to set to
with growing unrest; but, as one of the contact Gero by phone for the second work almost immediately. The troops
top Soviet officers later reported, the time that evening. Khrushchev urged under his command had been prepar-
leaders of the [Hungarian] party and Gero to send a written request for help ing since late July to undertake large-
members of the [Hungarian] govern- to the CPSU Presidium, but the Soviet scale operations aimed at upholding
ment did not adopt the measures called leader soon realized, after the brief con- and restoring public order in Hungary
for by the urgency of the situation. versation ended, that events in Budapest (see above). In accordance with the
Many of them were simply incapable were moving too fast for him to wait Volna plan, Soviet forces in Hungary
of evaluating the state of things realis- until he received a formal Hungarian had been placed on increased alert in
tically. 72 As a result, the violent up- request (which, incidentally, did not mid-October, and were brought to full
heavals on the evening of 23 October arrive until five days later).74 A Soviet combat alert on 19-21 October at the
quickly overwhelmed the Hungarian Presidium meeting had already been behest of the Soviet General Staff.78
police and security forces and caused scheduled for the 23rd to discuss other Hence, when the mobilization orders
widespread panic and near-paralysis matters, and Khrushchev abruptly arrived from Moscow on the night of
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]